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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UCA § 78-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue: Did the Court commit error in allowing the introduction of the personal 
medical records of Thomas Hawkes, where there was no foundation establishing that the 
Hospital had or should have had knowledge of the content of the records and had no 
opportunity to review the records or depose the physician who created them? 
Preserved: Transcript at p. 543, lines 5-12. 
Standard of Review: When a trial court is required to balance factors to determine 
the admissibility of evidence, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion or 
reasonability. Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White. 40 P.3d 1155 (Utah App. 2002) (citations 
omitted). 
Issue: Did the Court commit error, as a matter of law, in allowing the introduction 
of prior testimony from a deposition taken in another case in 1997, a case in which the 
Hospital was not a party and had no opportunity to cross-examine or develop the 
testimony? 
Preserved: Transcript at p. 39, lines 2-5. 
Standard of Review: Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with no 
deference to the trial court. Dalley v. Utah Valley Reg. Med. Ctr., 791 P.2d 193,195 
(Utah 1990). 
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Issue: Did the Court commit error in allowing the introduction of the results of 
dexterity tests conducted more than fifteen months after the surgery on the plaintiff, absent 
any foundation establishing a connection between those results and the condition of Dr. 
Hawkes fifteen months earlier? 
Preserved: Transcript at p. 961, lines 15-16. 
Standard of Review: When a trial court is required to balance factors to determine 
the admissibility of evidence, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion or 
reasonability. Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White. 40 P.3d 1155 (Utah App. 2002) (citations 
omitted). 
Issue: Did the Court commit error in allowing the introduction of unedited 
videotape testimony of a fact witness, Dr. Lonnie Paulos, whose testimony was offered for 
the purpose of telling the jury what he would have told the Hospital had he been asked? 
Preserved: Transcript at p. 152, p. 409, line 25, p. 410, line 1. 
Standard of Review: When a trial court is required to balance factors to determine 
the admissibility of evidence, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion or 
reasonability. Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White. 40 P.3d 1155 (Utah App. 2002) (citations 
omitted). 
Issue: Did the Court commit error in allowing Dr. Margaret Ensign, a radiologist 
with no training or experience in impairment, and who relied solely on reading one 
postoperative note written by Dr. Hawkes, to testify as an expert that Dr. Hawkes was 
impaired? 
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Preserved: Transcript at p. 1247, line 23. 
Standard of Review: When a trial court is required to balance factors to determine 
the admissibility of evidence, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion or 
reasonability. Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. White, 40 i* W 1 !5i (Utah A|»p 2002) (citations 
omitted). 
Issue: Did the Court commit error in allowing repeated references to records of 
evaluation at the Dayspring program, where there was no foundation for the admissibility 
of the records and they were excluded? 
Preserved: Transcript at p. I l l , lines 22-25. 
Standard of Review: When a trial court is required to balance factors to determine 
the admissibility of evidence, the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion or 
reasonability. Mule-Hide Prods. Co. v. white. 40 P.3d 1155 (Utah App. 2002) (citations 
omitted). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action claiming negligence in the credentialing and retention of Dr. 
Thomas Hawkes, a surgeon at Ashley Valley Medic:il Center ("the Hospital"). The matter 
was tried to a jury and a verdict, now disputed, was rendered in which the plaintiff was 
awarded $820,000 with an apportionment of 30% of fault to the Hospital. Jury Verdict 
Form, (Exhibit 1, Haase Addendum). 
Hospital objections to a number of attempts by Haase to introduce testimony which 
the defense felt was either more prejudicial than probative, or w ithout adequate foundation, 
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were overruled by the Court. This cross-appeal follows the plaintiffs appeal of the failure 
of the Court to revise the jury verdict in her favor, but addresses evidentiary rulings at trial 
rather than the verdict. 
The Hospital submits that there was prejudicial error in six rulings of the Court 
which, given the cumulative weight of the evidence and testimony at issue, are so 
significant that the outcome of the trial would likely have been different. 
First, the Court committed error in allowing the introduction into evidence of the 
personal medical records of Thomas Hawkes maintained by his private physician, Dr. Ace 
Madsen. The Court, having ruled in an unrelated case that the records be produced, made 
them available to Haase as well and required Dr. Madsen to testify about them. Transcript 
at p. 543, lines 5-12. The Hospital objected to the admission of the records, asserting that 
there was no foundation that Dr. Madsen shared with or had any obligation to share the 
records, or his impressions of his patient, with the Hospital. Transcript at p. 973, lines 
2-8. In addition to the untimely decision to admit the records, the result of which was that 
the Hospital had no opportunity to depose Dr. Madsen or obtain expert testimony, the 
records were relied upon by Haase's expert, Dr. Pasternak, as the foundation for testimony 
that Dr. Hawkes was impaired. Transcript, at p. 862, lines 1-5. 
Second, the Court committed error in allowing the introduction of the transcript of 
the deposition of Dr. Hawkes taken in another case to which the Hospital was not a party. 
The Hospital objected to the admission of the deposition testimony because it was not a 
party, was not present for the deposition, and had no opportunity to develop the testimony. 
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Transcript at p. 39, lines 2-5. The Hospital and Dr. Hawkes have distinct legal interests 
and the Hospital had no opportunity to raise objections unique to its interests. 
Third, the Court committed error in allowing the introduction of the results of a 
manual dexterity test administered to Dr Hawkes during the deposition Transcript at p. 
962, lines 3-5. As the Hospital was not a party, it had no opportunity to raise objections 
unique to its interests. Moreover, there was no expert testimony which established that 
the results of this 1997 test had any validity with respect to Dr. Hawkes' condition fifteen 
months earlier when the surgery on Haase was performed. 
Fourth, the Court committed error in allowing the unedited videotape deposition of 
Dr. Lonnie Paulos. Transcript at pp. 409, line 25, p. 410, lines 1-8. The Hospital also 
objected as to foundation, as l)i Paulos testified that was not certain that he shared any 
opinions with the Hospital, and affirmatively testified thai lie did not shaic the most critical 
of his opinions with the Hospital. Transcript at p. 151, lines 13-25, p 152, lines 1 4 
Fifth, the Court committed error in allowing a radiologist with no special training 
or experience in the evaluation of drug impairment to offer an expert opinion that Dr. 
Hawkes was impaired. Transcript at p. 1247, line 23. The Hospital also objected to the 
foundation for her opinion, a single post-operative note written by Dr. Hawkes. Transcript 
at p. 1251, lines 22-25, p.1252, lines 1-3. 
Sixth, the Court committed error in delaying a ruling on the Hospital's objection to 
the admission or use of records of Dr. Hawkes' evaluation al Dayspring, a mental health 
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and substance abuse program in Salt Lake City. The Hospital consistently objected to 
references to the records absent adequate foundation. Transcript at p. I l l , lines 22-25. 
The Hospital also objected on the grounds of relevance, asserting that as there was no 
testimony that the Hospital ever saw the records, or had knowledge of their content, 
references to the records in front of the jury were more prejudicial than probative. 
Transcript at p. 1192, lines 24-25. 
SUMMARY OF CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
The Hospital argues that the Court committed reversible error in (1) admitting the 
medical records of Dr. Hawkes; (2) admitting the transcript of Dr. Hawkes' deposition in 
another case prior to his death in 1997; (3) admitting the results of manual dexterity tests 
administered at that deposition in 1997; (4) admitting the unedited videotape of Dr. Lonnie 
Paulos and allowing all of the tape to be shown, including opinions which Dr. Paulos 
testified he never shared with the Hospital; (5) allowing a radiologist with inadequate 
qualifications to testify as an expert on impairment, and to do so on an inadequate 
foundation; and (6) allowing the introduction of references to and information from the 
records of Dr. Hawkes' evaluation at the Dayspring program after objection from the 
Hospital but before making a ruling on the objection. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PERSONAL MEDICAL 
RECORDS OF THOMAS HAWKES AS THERE WAS NO 
FOUNDATION ESTABLISHING THAT THE HOSPITAL 
HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONTENT OF THE 
RECORDS AND WHERE THE DEFENSE HAD NO 
OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE RECORDS OR 
DEPOSE THE PHYSICIAN WHO CREATED THEM. 
The Hospital objected to the admission or use of the personal medical records for 
Dr. Hawkes maintained by Ace Madsen, M.D., his personal physician. In addition to the 
unfair prejudice of the untimely release of the records, the Hospital objected on the 
grounds that Dr. Madsen never disclosed the records to the Hospital nor had any duty to 
do so. The circumstances under which these records came into the possession of Haase 
are unusual and are relevant to the Hospital's claim of error. 
Dr. Madsen's records were subpoenaed by attorneys for an unrelated plaintiff in 
another case pending before the same Court, and counsel for Dr. Hawkes filed a motion 
to quash the subpoena. Prior to the Haase trial, the Court heard oral arguments on release 
of the documents in the unrelated case, but did not immediately issue a ruling. The 
Court's ruling on the production of Dr. Madsen's records in that unrelated case was 
addressed at the Haase trial, but the Court made no record of why the documents were 
being released to counsel for Haase as well as to counsel in the other case. Transcript at 
p. 543, lines 5-12. 
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The Hospital objected at that time to the admission of Dr. Hawkes' records. 
Transcript at 543, lines 16-17. 
The release of the records was so untimely as to create unfair prejudice. It allowed 
the Hospital no opportunity to depose Dr. Madsen regarding his records or even to discuss 
the records with him informally prior to his testimony. The defense had no opportunity 
to call experts to support Dr. Madsen's contention that Dr. Hawkes was not a danger to 
patients, or to explain that reasonable physicians in Dr. Madsen's circumstances would 
have managed his patient in a similar way and reached similar conclusions. The inability 
to provide this testimony, which flowed directly from the Court's decision to order the 
records produced to Haase because it had decided to order them produced to a plaintiff in 
another case, substantially prejudiced the ability of the Hospital to respond. 
In addition to objecting to the release, the Hospital objected on the grounds of 
foundation: 
Mr. Harrison: Your Honor, just reiterate our standing objection as to foundation. 
There has been no foundation that Dr. Madsen shared with or had any 
obligation to share with the hospital his impressions of his private 
patient or these records. 
The Court: I will withhold a ruling until such time as it is established. 
Transcript at p. 973, lines 2-8. 
The core of the prejudicial error emerges here. If the records had disclosed that Dr. 
Madsen felt that Dr. Hawkes was a danger to patients under his care and that he shared 
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that concern with the Hospital, the records would be useful to the trier of fact in 
determining what the Hospital knew prior to the surgery on Haase. Without that 
foundation, however, the records add nothing to the question of what the Hospital knew 
and are more prejudicial than probative. The Court should have required Haase to establish 
foundation before allowing any other inquiry into those records to proceed, and the failure 
to do is reversible error. 
Notwithstanding the lack of foundation, the Court nevertheless allowed the jury to 
hear literally hours of testimony about the records maintained by Dr. Madsen. To allow 
the jury to hear extensive recitations from medical records without any foundation that the 
Hospital had or should have had any knowledge of the content of those records was highly 
prejudicial and the objection to discussion or admission of the records should have been 
sustained absent the necessary preliminary foundation. 
The Court acknowledged that the Hospital cannot be charged with failure to act 
upon information or opinions it did not have: "They can't have the knowledge to prevent 
him from operating unless they know the information. So if they don't know the 
information . . . then it's nothing that can be held against him (sic)." Transcript at p. 541, 
lines 4-9. Dr. Madsen did not share his records with the Hospital prior to the surgery on 
Haase nor indeed at any time prior to the death of Dr. Hawkes in 1997. Dr. Madsen 
testified that no one from the Hospital saw the medical records in question until June 15, 
1999. Transcript at p. 981, lines 4-7. 
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There is no testimony establishing that the Hospital had a duty to obtain the records, 
or to second-guess in any way Dr. Madsen's professional judgment that Thomas Hawkes 
was not a danger to patients. As it is clearly established that the Hospital did not see nor 
have any duty to see Dr. Madsen's records, those records should not have been admitted. 
The core of the prejudicial error is in allowing the records to be used for any 
purpose. However, an even greater prejudice here is that the plaintiffs expert, Dr. 
Pasternak, based his opinion that Dr. Hawkes was impaired on his review of Dr. Madsen's 
records. As an initial matter in attempting to qualify the witness, counsel for Haase asked 
Dr. Pasternak if he read the medical treatment records of Dr. Ace Madsen. Transcript at 
p. 71, lines 22-23. The Hospital objected on the basis of foundation, specifically that there 
had not been established "foundation that the hospital ever saw Dr. Ace Madsen's 
treatment records." Transcript at p. 781, lines 24-25 and p. 782, line 1. 
The Court's ruling illustrates the manner in which prejudicial material was admitted 
without adequate foundation, despite recognition by the Court that discussing the material 
would create a problem if the foundation were never established: 
The Court: I am going to overrule the objection and let him answer. It does create a 
problem if you don't get the information later, but we'll worry about that 
later. The objection is overruled. You may answer. 
Transcript at p. 782, lines 5 through 8. 
The Hospital reiterated its objection to Dr. Pasternak as an expert on physician 
impairment. Transcript at p. 858, lines 2-3. The Hospital also reiterated that the 
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information upon which Dr. Pasternak was relying was information not known to the 
Hospital. Transcript at p. 858, lines 4-19. On cross examination, in challenging Dr. 
Pasternak as an expert, the Hospital elicited that Dr. Pasternak is not a specialist in 
impairment, and that none of his medical practice as a physician is devoted to the 
evaluation or treatment of impaired physicians. Transcript at p. 861, lines 3-8. Dr. 
Pasternak further conceded that he had undertaken no evaluation of Dr. Hawkes, and that 
his opinions were based entirely on his review of medical records. Transcript at p. 862, 
lines 1-5. 
Had this witness not been given these records, the Hospital could have challenged 
the foundation for his opinion that Dr. Hawkes was probably impaired. Accordingly, the 
likelihood that the jury would have reached a different conclusion but for this error is 
substantial. 
II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING 
THE INTRODUCTION OF PRIOR TESTIMONY FROM 
A DEPOSITION TAKEN IN ANOTHER CASE IN 
WHICH THE HOSPITAL WAS NOT A PARTY AND 
HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP THE 
TESTIMONY. 
Any testimony given at proceedings to which the Hospital was not a party should 
have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Absent some statutorily-provided exception, 
hearsay is not admissible. Utah R.Evid. 802. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to 
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prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R.Evid. 801. Testimony from depositions 
taken in an action to which the Hospital was a not a party is hearsay, but as Dr. Hawkes 
was deceased at the time of trial, the only possible exception to the hearsay exclusion 
would be the provision for former testimony of an unavailable declarant. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence allow, in a civil case, an exception to the hearsay 
exclusion for deposition testimony from another proceeding if " . . . a predecessor in 
interest had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or 
redirect examination." White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe. 731 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 
1986) (citing Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(1)). Under this exception, in addition to establishing 
the unavailability of the witness, plaintiffs must demonstrate either that (a) the defendant 
was a party to the prior action, or (b) that a "predecessor in interest had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." IdL 
There is no dispute as to the unavailability of Dr. Hawkes, or that the Hospital was 
not a party to the action in which Dr. Hawkes was deposed. Thus, the only basis for 
admissibility is to show that (a) Dr. Hawkes was a predecessor in interest of the Hospital, 
and (b) had a similar motive to develop the testimony. 
Prior to opening statements, the Court addressed with counsel the issue of the 
deposition of Thomas Hawkes. The following exchange sets forth the Court's position. 
The Court: This is one of the most hotly contested parts, and I - you know, I 
recognize the difficulty that defense counsel has, because he was not 
the counsel that was there cross examining, but I assume there was 
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somebody there cross examining. I'm assured there was somebody 
there cross examining. Was it Mr. Rencher's office? 
Mr. Mortensen: Yes, it was David Epperson, the senior partner in his office. 
The Court: Okay. So I'm going to rule that that's admissible. I don't think its 
as clear-cut an issue as I would like it to be. 
Transcript at p. 38, lines 16-25. 
The Hospital objected at that time. Transcript at p. 39, lines 2-5. 
On the third day of trial, Haase proposed to read into the record the transcript of 
the deposition. As the Court had reserved its ruling on the pre-trial motion in limine filed 
by the Hospital, and announced its intention at trial to admit the deposition of Dr. Hawkes 
into the record, counsel objected again to the testimony. Transcript at p. 423, lines 2-10. 
There is no case law or authority supporting the conclusion that, in litigation 
pursued by plaintiffs in stages, a physician is a predecessor in interest to a hospital at 
which he is alleged to have injured a patient. The Hospital and the physician have separate 
and distinct legal interests, and indeed Haase brought separate and distinct legal claims 
against the Hospital and the physician. The claim against Dr. Hawkes was for negligence 
in the performance of medical care, the claim against the Hospital is for negligence in its 
administrative functions prior to the provision of that medical care. 
Even if the Hospital and Dr. Hawkes were deemed to have an identity of interest 
adequate to make him a predecessor in interest for purposes of the hearsay exception, he 
did not have a similar motive to develop testimony that would be relevant to the claim 
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against the Hospital. The Hospital had no opportunity to raise objections unique to its 
interests. 
Accordingly, as Dr. Hawkes was not a predecessor in interest to the Hospital and 
did not have an adequately similar motive to develop testimony, his deposition transcript 
and the associated manual dexterity examination should be excluded as inadmissible 
hearsay. 
III. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING 
THE INTRODUCTION OF THE RESULTS OF 
DEXTERITY TESTS CONDUCTED MORE THAN 
FIFTEEN MONTHS AFTER THE SURGERY ON THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
Any testimony given at proceedings to which the Hospital was not a party should 
be excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Absent some statutorily-provided exception, hearsay 
is not admissible. Utah R.Evid. 802. Hearsay is defined as "a statement, other than one 
made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted." Utah R.Evid. 801. Testimony from depositions taken in an 
action to which the Hospital was a not a party are hearsay, but as Dr. Hawkes was 
deceased, the only possible exception to the hearsay exclusion would be the provision for 
former testimony of an unavailable declarant. 
The Utah Rules of Evidence allow, in a civil case, an exception to the hearsay 
exclusion for deposition testimony from another proceeding if ". . . a predecessor in 
interest had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross or 
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redirect examination." White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe. 731 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 
1986)(citing Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(1)). Under this exception, in addition to establishing the 
unavailability of the witness, plaintiffs must demonstrate either that (a) the defendant was 
a party to the prior action, or (b) that a "predecessor in interest had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." Id 
As argued above, the Hospital submits that Dr. Hawkes was not a predecessor in 
interest to the Hospital. Therefore, the entire deposition, including the manual dexterity 
test administered as part of the deposition, should be excluded. 
The Hospital objected to the introduction of the records of this dexterity test. 
Transcript at p. 961, lines 15-16. The objection to lack of foundation was grounded in 
the impossibility that the Hospital could have known, prior to the surgery in March of 
1996, what these tests showed in the summer of 1997. Transcript at p. 961, lines 18-24. 
Also completely absent was any foundation establishing that the test in 1997 was reliable 
as a reflection of Dr. Hawkes' condition two to four years earlier, or indeed at any time 
in the past. 
The absence of the Hospital as a party at the time of the test precluded the 
possibility that the Hospital could appeal the ruling which allowed a physical dexterity test 
to be performed without notice to Dr. Hawkes. The Hospital had no opportunity to raise 
objections unique to its interests. 
Absent any expert testimony that connects the 1997 test result with some reliable 
determination of Dr. Hawkes' manual dexterity on the day of the surgery on Haase in 
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1996, the results are more prejudicial than probative and leave the jury to speculate as to 
their significance. The Hospital submits that admission of the test results was prejudicial 
error. 
IV. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING 
THE INTRODUCTION OF UNEDITED VIDEOTAPE 
TESTIMONY OF A FACT WITNESS, DR. LONNIE 
PAULOS, WHOSE TESTIMONY WAS OFFERED FOR 
THE PURPOSE OF TELLING THE JURY WHAT HE 
WOULD HAVE TOLD THE HOSPITAL HAD HE BEEN 
ASKED. 
Haase was allowed to show an unedited videotape of a deposition of Lonnie Paulos, 
M.D., a fact witness, over the objection of the Hospital. The Hospital explicitly objected 
to showing an unedited videotape. Transcript at p. 409, line 25, p. 410, line 1. 
There appear to be no Utah cases which explicitly address the issue of allowing 
unedited videotape depositions at trial in lieu of having the witness present. However, it 
is widely recognized that, where videotape testimony is allowed, the tape must first be 
edited to remove objectionable portions. See, e.g.. In Re Stratosphere Corporation 
Securities Litigation. 182 F.R.D. 614, 617 (D. Nev.) The District of Nevada permits 
videotaped depositions at trial "unless it appears that . . . it may be difficult to edit 
objectionable portions of a video deposition for presentation at trial." IdL 
Recent state court decisions recognize the need for editing videotapes before 
presentation to the jury. See, e ^ , Hodge v. Lott. 553 S.E.2d 652, 653 (Georgia App. 
2001) (deposition objections ruled on by the court as a pre-trial matter so that edited 
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deposition videotape could be presented to jury); March v. Associated Materials. Inc.. 
1999 W.L. 1037739 (Ohio App. 1999) (defendant's objections addressed prior to 
presentation to the jury and videotape edited accordingly); Sponenburgh v. County of 
Wayne. 308 N.W. 2d 589 (Mich. App. 1981) (videotaped deposition must be edited before 
presentation to the jury); Gage v. Morse. 933 S.W. 2d 410, 422 (Mo. Ap. 1996) (court 
viewed both edited and unedited videotaped depositions before deciding what the jury 
could see). 
Indeed, the Court here recognized the inherent difficulty in allowing unedited 
videotape, explaining to the jury: 
The Court: [There are some objections during the videotape] that would have been 
sustained and you would not have heard the testimony had I been there ruling 
and listening to it while that deposition was taking place. That's the problem 
with using this kind of a thing that isn't first censored, you see, for it, but 
he'd want you to know it from his point of view, because he can't very well 
go back and say, "Remember, and I object" you see. 
Transcript at p. 515, lines 1-6. 
As the Court recognized, it is impossible to look back at objections and conclude 
what the ruling would have been. However, as Dr. Paulos testified about criticisms of Dr. 
Hawkes he held in 1995 and 1996, criticisms he admits he never shared with anyone at the 
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Hospital, it is reasonable to assume that an objection as to foundation and relevance with 
respect to the majority of his testimony would have been sustained.1 
The Hospital objected to having the jury hear testimony about what Dr. Paulos 
might have said to the Hospital over a period of years if he had been asked. Transcript at 
p. 152, lines 13-19. The Hospital was allowed to read into the record a segment of Dr. 
Paulos' deposition in which he conceded that he could not say to any degree of certainty 
that he ever said anything to the Hospital regarding Dr. Hawkes. Transcript at p. 151, 
lines 13-25, p. 152, lines 1-4. Dr. Paulos admits that if he had a conversation with the 
Hospital it would have been only in 1993, and not at any other time. Transcript at p. 152, 
lines 5-12. Most importantly, he cannot remember what, if anything, he said in 1993, 
testifying only "I think I didn't have very good things to say." Transcript at p. 151, lines 
15-21. 
As the transcript which Haase asked the Court to admit clearly established that Dr. 
Paulos was not sure he ever said anything to the Hospital, and that if he did say anything 
it would only have been in response to an initial inquiry in 1993, the Hospital's objection 
was that such testimony was inadequate to establish foundation for an entire line of 
questions asking Dr. Paulos what his opinions of Dr. Hawkes were in subsequent years 
1
 The Hospital's objections to foundation and relevance, at the time of the 
deposition, are found at page 16, lines 2-3, Deposition of Lonnie Paulos, an addendum 
hereto. The videotape shown at trial was inaudible to the court reporter and thus is not 
reproduced in the trial transcript. Transcript at p. 412. 
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and what he would have said to the Hospital had he been asked. Transcript at p. 152, lines 
13-19. 
At no point did Haase establish that the Hospital had any obligation to contact Dr. 
Paulos in subsequent years or that Dr. Paulos had any duty to inform the Hospital of his 
opinions. Absent that foundation testimony, the ruling which allowed the jury to listen to 
Dr. Paulos' criticisms of Dr. Hawkes was clearly more prejudicial than probative of what 
the Hospital knew and should not have been allowed. 
The prejudicial result here is that had the Court ruled on objections to the testimony 
offered by Dr. Paulos, much of it would not have been heard by the jury. Transcript at 
p. 515, lines 1-2. It is reasonable to conclude that the Court would not have allowed 
testimony from Dr. Paulos given his testimony that his most negative opinions were never 
communicated to anyone at the Hospital. 
Dr. Paulos was critical of the skills of Dr. Hawkes, and told the jury he had highly 
negative opinions in 1995 and 1996. Deposition of Lonnie Paulos at p. 16 (Exhibit 1, 
Addendum). These negative opinions added to the cumulative effect on the jury. Had Dr. 
Paulos' opinions not been communicated to the jury, they would not have heard that 
negative view of Dr. Hawkes, the cumulative effect would have been less, and the outcome 
may well have been different. Therefore, the Court's decision to allow the unedited 
videotape of Dr. Paulos' deposition was prejudicial error. 
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V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING A 
RADIOLOGIST WITH NO TRAINING OR 
EXPERIENCE IN IMPAIRMENT, AND WHO RELIED 
SOLELY ON READING ONE POSTOPERATIVE NOTE, 
TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT THAT DR. HAWKES 
WAS IMPAIRED. 
Despite her candid admission that she is a musculoskeletal radiologist with no 
special training or experience in evaluating physicians (or any other patient) with drug-
related impairment, Dr. Margaret Ensign was allowed to offer an expert opinion that 
Thomas Hawkes was an impaired physician. Her sole basis for offering that opinion was 
her conclusion that the post-operative note written by Dr. Hawkes seemed confusing and 
inconsistent. Transcript at p. 1251, lines 23-25. 
Trial courts have discretion to determine whether a particular witness offered as an 
expert is qualified to give an expert opinion on a matter. Dikeauv. Osborn. 881 P.2d 943, 
947 (Utah App. 1984) (quoting Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991)). 
The reasoning is instructive: 
By definition, an expert is one who possesses a significant depth and breadth 
of knowledge on a given subject. To allow a doctor in one specialty, 
retained as an expert witness, to become an expert on the standard of care 
in a different medical specialty by merely reading and studying the 
documents in a given case invites confusion, error, and a trial fraught with 
unreliable testimony. 
881P.2dat947. 
Although these cases specifically addressed questions of the standard of care, they 
also make clear that the rule applies to proximate causation as well. Kent v. Pioneer 
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Vallev Hospital. 930 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting testimony from an expert 
who was not "competent to testify on . . . proximate causation."). See also: Chadwick 
v. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 822 (Utah App. 1988) ("it is sound policy to limit expert 
testimony in medical malpractice cases to that which is within the doctor's specific field 
of practice."). 
The rationale of these rulings is that the mere fact that a person is a physician does 
not give them expertise in all aspects of medicine. Beyond a medical degree, it is also 
required that one who offers testimony as an expert possess "significant depth and breadth 
of knowledge" on the subject of which testimony is offered. 930 P.2d at 906. Other 
courts have elaborated the scope of the trial court's discretion in qualifying expert 
witnesses, recognizing that merely being a physician is not an adequate basis for expert 
testimony on any medical question. Hardy v. Brantley. 417 So.2d 358 (Mississippi 1985) 
("the trial judge should seek to assure that the proffered witness really is an expert in the 
area in which his opinion testimony is offered."). 
The Hospital objected to having Dr. Ensign testify as an expert on impairment, and 
to do so by telephone. Transcript at p. 22, lines 6-14, p. 23, lines 7-18. The Court 
overruled the objections, despite its observation "seeing somebody do something or say 
something is very, very important, but in spite of that I am going to let her do by phone." 
Transcript at p. 25, lines 9-11. 
Following these discussions on the first day of trial, upon the subsequent offer of 
Dr. Ensign's testimony, the Hospital again objected to allowing Dr. Ensign to offer 
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opinions on impairment. Transcript at p. 1247, line 23. The Court overruled the 
objection, but allowed voir dire. Dr. Ensign conceded that she is not a specialist on 
impairment and that her basis for concluding that Dr. Hawkes was an impaired physician 
was solely and exclusively the fact that she found his operative note confusing. Transcript 
at p. 1251, lines 23-25. 
The Hospital objected to sole reliance upon an orthopedic surgeon's post-operative 
note as foundation for an expert opinion that the surgeon was impaired. Transcript at p. 
1251, lines 22-25; p. 1252, lines 1-3. The Court overruled the objection and Dr. Ensign 
was allowed to testify. 
Dr. Ensign offered an opinion that Dr. Hawkes was had a medical condition of 
impairment, based solely upon a note he wrote about another patient. To allow this 
testimony is inconsistent with the requirement that a physician do more than "merely 
reading and studying the documents in a given case . . .." 881 P.2d at 947. The Court 
did not comply with the requirement of Utah law to insure that Dr. Ensign has "significant 
depth and breadth of knowledge" on the subject of physician impairment. 930 P.2d at 906. 
Dr. Ensign was not adequately qualified as an expert on impairment, and there was 
inadequate foundation for her testimony. For both of these reasons, her testimony should 
not have been admitted. As with all assertions of reversible error, there must be some 
indication that a different outcome might have resulted but for the ruling of the Court. Dr. 
Ensign did not testify as to some peripheral or secondary issue. A key issue in this case 
is whether Dr. Hawkes was impaired and she was allowed to offer an expert opinion to 
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that effect. Absent that testimony, the jury may well have been less likely to conclude that 
Dr. Hawkes was impaired. 
VI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING 
REFERENCES TO DAYSPRING RECORDS REGARDING 
DR. HAWKES WHERE THERE WAS NO FOUNDATION 
FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF RECORDS OF THAT 
PROGRAM. 
In September of 1995, Dr. Hawkes was evaluated at the Dayspring program in Salt 
Lake City. There are no explanatory references in the trial record because the Court 
ultimately refused to allow the admission of the Dayspring2 records. However, Haase 
repeatedly attempted to introduce the records indirectly, despite repeated objections from 
the Hospital. It was prejudicial error for the Court to allow continued references to, and 
characterizations of, the evaluation of Dr. Hawkes without first requiring adequate 
foundation for any reference to those records. 
Testimony is admissible only if it is relevant. Utah R. Evid. 402. Relevant evidence 
is that having any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. Utah R. 
Evid. 401. However, testimony should be excluded where it is more prejudicial than 
probative. Utah R. Evid. 403. In this case, Haase never established that the records of Dr. 
Hawkes' evaluation at the Dayspring program were probative of what the Hospital knew, 
2
 "Dayspring" was a program of Intermountain Health Care offering evaluation 
and treatment for problems of mental illness and substance abuse. References to 
"Dayspring" are to that program. 
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and did not allow their admission. However, rather than require Haase to establish the 
requisite foundation at the time of the objection, the Court withheld a ruling until near the 
end of trial, allowing multiple references to Day spring and the records. 
The Hospital consistently objected to references to Dayspring absent proper 
foundation. Transcript at p. I l l , lines 22-25. The Hospital also objected on the grounds 
of relevance, asserting that as there was no testimony or evidence that the Hospital ever 
saw the records, or had knowledge of their content, references to the content of the records 
in front of the jury were more prejudicial than probative. Transcript at p. 1192, lines 24-
25. Indeed, the Court recognized that the records should not be admitted without 
proper foundation. 
The Court: Okay, let me answer you anyway. It does sound like part of this is 
DOPL, but Judge Bunnell looked at it. I don't know what he said, I 
don't what the discussions were, except the only thing I have seen is 
his order, and he ordered Dayspring to give you the records, and so 
you've got the records. . . . 
Nevertheless, I think by giving you the records, the judge was saying 
they were usable if - and this was the 'if that I had the other day 
when I talked to you about it, was that you show before we use them 
that somehow that information got back to the hospital. 
That's the connecting link that concerned me the other day, and it is 
still the one that concerns me now. So I can't let you use it until you 
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make that jump. In other words, they have to know. It isn't enough 
for Dayspring to know. The hospital has to know that. 
Transcript at p. 540, lines 7-25. 
The Court: So if they don't know the information from Dayspring, then its 
nothing that can be held against him (sic). 
Transcript at p. 541, lines 7-9 (emphasis added). 
Ultimately, the Hospital's objection was sustained. 
The Court: I'm going to sustain an objection to the use of the records at 
Dayspring. I just don't think the tie has been made - of course this 
is one of those early-on things that we discussed before the Court and 
I had concerns early on that I wanted the connection made first, and 
I don't believe the connection has been made to show that the 
information went back. Just to say that the hospital should have 
known and should have done something, I don't think is enough. So 
they are excluded. 
Transcript at p. 1196, lines 6-14. 
However, this was only after the jury had heard repeated references to Dayspring 
(from Haase) over a period of days, and it is illogical to suggest that the jury was not 
influenced. The Court should have required the necessary foundation before allowing 
repeated references to Dayspring, and the failure to so was prejudicial error. 
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Moreover, the ruling did not come until after Dr. Pasternak, plaintiffs expert, was 
allowed to testify based upon his review of the Dayspring records. Transcript at p. 
843, lines 1-19. The Hospital objected to reference to the records: 
Mr. Harrison: Your Honor, I have an objection to quoting from the Day Spring 
record. We haven't gotten around to bringing those records in yet. 
The Court: Well, I'll withhold a ruling on that. I recognize that it lets it be 
heard, but - -
Transcript at p. 843, lines 4-8. 
Had the Court made its ruling before Dr. Pasternak testified, the Hospital could 
have challenged that portion of the foundation for his opinion. The delay in that critical 
ruling deprived the Hospital of that challenge. Had a challenge to the foundation for Dr. 
Pasternak's opinion been sustained, it is likely that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion. Allowing the jury to hear testimony from Dr. Pasternak and from Haase about 
these records before ruling on their admissibility was prejudicial error. 
SUMMARY OF APPELLEE'S ANSWER TO APPELLANT 
The Hospital argues that the Court was correct in refusing to accept juror affidavits 
as dispositive because the record clearly establishes that the jury was plagued by confusion 
and a lack of clarity, and therefore the error which led to the challenged verdict was 
judicial rather than clerical as defined by the cases of Utah and other states. Because the 
Court did not err in refusing to accept the juror affidavits, and because the affidavits do 
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not meet the tests for admissibility under Utah law, they cannot form the basis for an 
appeal and therefore the appeal should be denied. 
The Hospital also argues that Haase cannot now criticize the jury instructions or the 
Special Verdict Form as her failure to raise the issue at trial precludes raising the issue 
now on appeal. However, the Haase brief does make a case for the existence of substantial 
juror confusion. The Utah Supreme Court and courts of other jurisdictions have held that 
the remedy for confusion and misunderstanding in reaching a jury verdict is a new trial, 
not revision of the verdict. Accordingly, if the Court of Appeals finds any error in the 
jury verdict, the appropriate remedy is a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO ACCEPT JUROR AFFIDAVITS AS 
DISPOSITIVE. 
Haase argues that the holding of Bishop v. GenTec. Inc.. 48 P.3d 218 (Utah 2002), 
strongly suggests that the juror affidavits are dispositive of this case. Appellant's Brief at 
12. That argument is misplaced because the facts are inapposite. 
Bishop does not allow the unrestricted admission of affidavits in Rule 60(a) motions, 
it allows affidavits only to correct clerical errors which do not reflect the intent of the 
parties and only "so long as it is clearly a formal error . . . ." IcL at 227 (quoting Stanger 
v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance Company. 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983)). Nor 
does it hold that courts must revise or amend a jury verdict to conform to the jury's intent 
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in all situations, it holds only that affidavits may be received (in conjunction with Rule 
60(a) motions) to establish that there was a clerical error in reporting the intent of the 
jurors. Id Therefore, the fundamental question as to admissibility of juror affidavits is 
whether there was clerical error or judicial error.3 
The authorities relied upon by the Utah Supreme Court in Bishop provide 
instructive evidence of the contours of this doctrine, supporting the proposition that 
where jurors were confused or misunderstood the law as to how to express their intent, the 
error is judicial and affidavits are not admissible. Of particular relevance is the Court's 
citation to Moisakis v. Allied Building Products Corporation. 697 NYS 2d 100, 105-06 
(NY App. Div. 1999), a case holding that juror evidence may be used to correct clerical 
errors, "but not to determine the extent of juror confusion regarding the verdict as 
rendered." RL at n.5 (emphasis added). 
Also instructive is Pachev.Boehm. 60 A.D.2d 867 (N. Y. App. 1978), another case 
from New York4 involving confusion and misunderstanding in apportionment of fault. The 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held: 
3
 The distinction between clerical and judicial error is critical in Haase's 
argument because her persistent and consistent theme is that the jurors were confused, 
misunderstood, and needed more clarity. Those are the defining characteristics of 
judicial error rather than clerical error. 
4
 The use of cases from New York may have greater persuasive authority than 
usual given the reliance upon New York case law by this Court in reaching its decision 
in Bishop v. GenTec, Inc. 
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Where errors are made in reporting a verdict, the Trial Judge may, in his 
sole discretion and upon the unanimous affidavits or statements of jurors, 
correct the judgement in accordance with actual verdicts. However, this 
exception to the general rule prohibiting impeachment of jury verdicts 
was not intended to encompass jury error in reaching a proper verdict. 
Where the record demonstrates substantial confusion in reaching a 
verdict the court may only direct a new trial to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice to individual litigants. 
60 A.D.2d at 868 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
A recent analysis from the Fifth Circuit provides additional perspective on the scope 
and availability of Rule 60(a): "It is only mindless and mechanistic mistakes, minor 
shifting of facts, and no new additional legal perambulations which are reachable through 
Rule 60(a)." United States v. Kellogg. 12 F.3d 497, 505 (5th Cir. 1994). 
All legal authorities identified, including those relied upon by Haase, are clear that 
where jurisdictions allow the consideration of juror affidavits, it is only for the purpose of 
correcting a clerical error. The phrase "clerical error," if not a term of art, is at least well 
enough defined in Utah case law to permit judicial review. 
The Utah Supreme Court defined clerical mistake as " . . . a type of mistake or 
omission mechanical in nature which is apparent on the record and which does not involve 
a legal decision or judgment by an attorney." Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Insurance 
Company. 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983). In Stanger. the jury based its award to the 
plaintiff upon a mistaken calculation of an amount withheld from sales commissions. IdL 
The Court found that the error was simply the use of an incorrect figure and did not 
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involve any judgment by the jury as to the legal effect or proper calculation of apportioned 
damages. LdL 
In 1984, one year after the Stanger decision, the Utah Supreme Court again 
considered the nature of clerical error: "Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a 
substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error is unilateral. The fact that an 
intention was subsequently found to be mistaken would not cause the mistake to be 
"clerical." Lindsay v. Atkin. 680 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1984). 
At issue in Lindsay was a determination of the trial court that a defendant should 
be granted dismissal with prejudice, a dismissal which was subsequently challenged in an 
action for indemnification by another defendant. IcL The Court indicated that if the 
dismissal was an error, it was judicial rather than clerical because it was a mistake in 
rendering the judgment, not in recording it. IdL The Court noted: "Rule 60(a) is not 
intended to correct errors of a substantial nature, particularly where the claim of error is 
unilateral." IcL 
Other jurisdictions have been equally clear that juror confusion or misunderstanding 
regarding the judge's instruction is not clerical error and is not susceptible to revision on 
the basis of juror affidavits. See ,e^ , Kitt v. Yakima County. 596 P.2d 314, 317 (Wash. 
App. 1979). In Kkt, The Washington Court of Appeals found that juror affidavits are not 
competent to revise a verdict where a misunderstanding of instructions was inherent in the 
verdict. IcL Jury misunderstanding of trial court instructions in comparative negligence 
cases is grounds for a new trial, not for revision of the verdict. IcL 
-30-
It is the general rule that where the jury had a clear intent at the time of their 
deliberations, but made a mistake in recording that intent, the verdict should reflect their 
true intent. Moulton v. Staats. 27 P.2d 455, 459 (Utah 1933V However, no case supports 
revision of a verdict where there is substantial evidence that the jury did not fully 
understand what it was doing. The rule allows correction of clerical errors in recording 
a clearly understood verdict, it does not provide a post-trial forum for the jury to listen 
to counsel5 and reconsider issues about which there was confusion or misunderstanding. 
The United States Supreme Court articulated this very point, recognizing the 
danger that if "verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked 
and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication . . . all verdicts 
could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something 
which might invalidate the finding." McDonald v. Pless. 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915). 
In this case, the juror statements indicate that the jury was confused about the 
verdict it should render. The Haase brief is replete with references to, and in some cases 
explanations of, the various ways in which the Court contributed to the confusion and 
misunderstanding of the jurors, and Haase concedes that judicial error was a factor, yet 
she asks this Court to ignore all of that and conclude that this was a simple clerical error. 
5
 After the trial, the jurors had unrestricted conversations with counsel for 
Haase, but before the Hospital's counsel could meet with them to discuss the affidavits 
prepared by Haase, the Court entered an order prohibiting any further contact between 
counsel and the jury. 
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For example, Haase argues that the Court contributed to the jury's misunderstanding 
in its response to a mid-deliberation question from the jury regarding calculation of 
damages and apportionment of fault, asserting "although there was an occasion for the 
Court to allow counsel to help dispel any misunderstanding the jury may have had due to 
the absence of apportionment instructions, the Court did not contact counsel. Rather, it 
returned a terse note to the jury undertaking to answer its question." Appellant's Brief at 
p. 8. 
Haase also complains that the Court, rather than adopting or modifying a Special 
Verdict Form submitted by counsel, revealed during its reading of instructions to the jury 
that it intended to use a form created (by the Court) during the noon break. Appellant's 
Brief at p. 6. Haase asserts "counsel were neither asked nor permitted to comment on 
the Court's Special Verdict Form prior to its being presented to the jury. They had no 
opportunity even to see it until shortly before it was read to the jury." Appellant's Brief 
at p. 6. She complains that, "despite counsel's effort," the Court did not resolve prior to 
trial the question of how her settlement with Dr. Hawkes would be handled with respect 
to the jury. Appellant's Brief at pp. 4, 5. 
Although the impermissibility of waiting until appeal to complain of the Special 
Verdict Form is addressed below, the key point is that Haase asserts that the Court 
committed an error which added to confusion and uncertainty in the jury deliberations. 
Haase notes that, in response to a question from the jury regarding the 
apportionment and calculation of damages, the jury was instructed by the Court to calculate 
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"the total value of all damages." Appellant's Brief at p. 18. The footnote offered here is 
yet another illustration of Haase's recognition that the jurors were not clear on what they 
were doing. Haase suggests that the Court assumed the jury would understand its 
instruction, but asserts "what may have seemed perfectly clear to the trial court may not 
have been clear to the jurors." Appellant's Brief at p. 18. However, Haase discusses an 
exchange between the Court and Juror Chad Watt (foreperson of the jury) at the beginning 
of the hearing, and in this exchange there is no lack of clarity in the Court's question or 
Mr. Watts' answer: 
The Court: Okay. Let me ask you the question again, because its very carefully 
worded. Did your $820,000 verdict include all of the plaintiff's injuries, 
those caused by Dr. Hawkes as well as those caused by Ashley Valley 
Medical Center? 
Mr. Watt: It was mine. 
The Court: It was the total $820,000, was her total damages? 
Mr. Watt: It is what I thought was the total damage. 
Hearing Transcript at p. 7 (Exhibit 5, Haase Addendum). 
Elsewhere in her brief, Haase complains again of the extent to which the Court 
created confusion and misunderstanding: 
The trial court determined on its own to give the jury a Special Verdict Form 
asking it to compare fault. However, the Court did not give the jury any 
instructions on comparative negligence or apportionment of fault and did not 
tell the jury what it intended to do with the fault apportionment figures it was 
being asked to enter on its verdict form. The jury, therefore, was in the 
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dark as to whether or how its comparative fault figures would impact Mrs. 
Haase. 
Appellant's Brief at p. 29. 
The passage from Juror Toni Fagnan relied upon by Haase illustrates the confusion 
and lack of understanding among the jurors. Fagnan states, in part, "we sent a note out 
to the judge seeking an answer. He wrote back suggesting we refer to a particular jury 
instruction. Neither the judge's note nor the jury instruction answered our question." 
Appellant's Brief at p. 23. Elsewhere Haase asserts again that the Court created confusion 
with the Special Verdict Form it used, Appellant's Brief at p. 32, concedes that the jurors 
were seeking (and therefore lacked) clarity, Appellant's Brief at p. 33, and asserts "the 
jury was not adequately instructed on matters of comparative negligence and apportionment 
of fault . . . ." Appellant's Brief at p. 33. If the Court erred or created confusion in 
instructing the jury that Dr. Hawkes was negligent and that some percentage of fault could 
be apportioned to him, it was judicial error rather than clerical error. 
It is instructive to contrast these facts with the facts in the Eastridge case cited by 
Haase. Appellant's Brief at p. 12. In Eastridge. the jury mistakenly deducted 20% from 
its verdict of $260,000, having apportioned 80% of the fault to the defendant, and wrote 
$208,000 on the special verdict form. Eastridge Development Co. v. Halpert Associates. 
853 F.2d 772, 783 (10th Cir. 1988). The Eastridge court noted the mathematical 
symmetry, specifically that $208,000 is 80% of the plaintiffs claimed damages of 
$260,000. Id^ The jury claim that they made a mistaken calculation in deducting 20% 
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from their true verdict was consistent with and supported by calculations which could 
easily be made from the face of the verdict form. This is an example of the kind of formal 
clerical error correctable on the basis of affidavits. This is factually very different from 
the case now before this Court. Here, neither the theories advanced by Haase nor the 
juror responses on May 2, 2002 explain how the jury arrived at the verdict it entered on 
the Special Verdict Form. 
Unlike the facts in Eastridge, the argument made by Haase makes no sense 
mathematically. If the jury based its special damages award on the testimony of the 
plaintiffs damages experts, without any reduction, 30% of that amount would be 
$372,570, not $600,000 [1,241,900 x .30 = 372,570]. In the alternative, if the jury 
intended to award $600,000 thinking that was 30% of the plaintiffs special damages, the 
jury would have to have assumed special damages to be $2,000,000 [2,000,000 x .30 = 
600,000], an amount almost twice that argued by the plaintiffs expert. 
Neither of these scenarios makes any sense as a mere mistaken calculation, and as 
evidenced by the comments of juror Fagnan, the jury did not make any calculation that 
would result in a 30% award equaling $820,000. 
The Court: Did the thought ever occur to you that the damages to be 100 percent 
would have to be over two million? 
Ms. Fagnan: For? 
The Court: For the hospital to pay that amount. 
Ms. Fagnan: Pardon me? 
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The Court: For the hospital to pay 820,000. 
Ms. Fagnan: No, that didn't. 
The Court: Did that ever occur to anybody? 
Unidentified Woman Juror: Not until later. 
Ms. Fagnan: No. For me, it was hard to try to think in that many zeroes, if you 
want to know the truth. 
Transcript of Jury Hearing at p. 12 (Exhibit 5, Haase Addendum). 
Haase concedes that "judicial or attorney error may have caused or contributed to 
the disparity between the Court's and the jury's understanding of the jury's damage 
award." Appellant's Brief at p. 31. She then argues that judicial error does not provide 
a basis for retrial. ftL The Hospital addresses below the legal question of a new trial as 
the proper remedy for judicial error; the relevant point here is that the fact that Haase 
concedes that there was judicial error, misunderstanding, and a lack of clarity in the jury 
deliberations. 
Another important consideration is the appearance of the record. Utah law is clear 
that a clerical error must be "apparent on the record." 669 P.2d at 1206. This is a well-
established rule of law. Indeed, one appellate court held that where a trial court finds it 
necessary to hear proof to determine whether an alleged mistake was clerical, that is itself 
a sufficient demonstration that the error is not apparent on the face of the record and 
therefore cannot be clerical. Tillman v. Tillman. 172 F.2d 270, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1948), 
cert, den., 336 U.S. 954 (1948). 
-36-
The record here reflects a jury verdict form which does not have blank spaces or 
obvious inadvertencies such as the misplacing of commas or decimal points. There is no 
mechanical or clerical error apparent on the Special Verdict Form or in the record. 
Therefore, consistent with the law of Utah and other jurisdictions, the error cannot be 
characterized as clerical and is not susceptible to modification based upon juror affidavits. 
II. 
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE SPECIAL VERDICT 
FORM OR THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE VERDICT AT 
TRIAL IS A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO RAISE THE 
ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Appellant's objections to the format of the Special Verdict Form are precluded by 
her failure to raise these issues at trial. It is well established in Utah that the failure to 
raise objections to the form of a Special Verdict or the sufficiency of a verdict so recorded, 
before the jury is dismissed, constitutes a waiver of the right to raise those issues on 
appeal. Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather. 605 P.2d 1240, 1247-1248 (Utah 1980). 
In Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp., the plaintiff appealed the responses the jury gave to 
questions on the special verdict, and the defendant responded that the plaintiff "waived any 
objection to the jury's determination by not objecting to the answers when they were 
originally returned." JcL The Court's analysis reiterated the holding of an earlier case 
addressing the same question: "It is well established by numerous authorities that when 
a verdict is not in the proper form and the jury is not required to clarify it, any error in 
said verdict is waived by the party relying thereon who at the time of its rendition failed 
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to make any request that its informality or uncertainty be corrected." IcL (quoting Cohn 
v. J.C. Penny. Inc.. 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975)). 
The Court compared the facts to those of another case in which the failure to object 
to a jury verdict at the time it was announced precluded appeal, quoting its earlier analysis 
in that case: 
If counsel be permitted to remain mute when a verdict is insufficient or 
informal, he gains an unfair strategic advantage and since there must be 
reasonable rules to control the termination of litigation if counsel has an 
opportunity to correct the error at the time of its occurrence and he fails to 
do so, any objection based thereupon is waived. 
IcL (quoting Langton v. International Transport. Inc.. 491 P.2d 1211, 1214 (Utah 1971)). 
In this case, the plaintiff made no objection to the special verdict form, neither when 
read to the jury nor several hours later when returned by the jury. She made no objection 
to the sufficiency of the verdict. Under the rule of law in Utah, the failure to object to 
the form or the sufficiency of the verdict prior to discharge of the jury constitutes a waiver 
of the right to raise the issue on appeal. 
III. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE 
INADEQUACY OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS ARE 
PRECLUDED BY HER FAILURE TO OBJECT AT 
TRIAL. 
Haase argues that the confusion of the jury was due to the lack of appropriate jury 
instructions on comparative negligence and apportionment of fault. Appellant's Brief at 
29, 30-31. She reiterates this assertion in several places, for example, "the jury was not 
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adequately instructed on matters of comparative negligence and apportionment of fault." 
Appellant's Brief at 33. 
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with precisely this issue in 1983 in a case in which 
the plaintiff failed to object or otherwise preserve any exceptions to the jury instructions 
as submitted. E.A. Strout Western Realty v. W.C. Foy & Sons. 665 P.2d 1320, 1322 
(Utah 1983). The Court held: "A party may not assign as error the giving or the failure 
to give an instruction unless he objects thereto, and the objection must be sufficiently 
specific to give the trial court notice of the claimed error." IcL 
Haase did not object to the Court's failure to give jury instructions on comparative 
negligence or apportionment of fault, and her failure to object at trial precludes raising the 
issue on appeal. 
IV 
THE EXTENT OF JUROR CONFUSION AND 
MISUNDERSTANDING IN THIS CASE STRONGLY 
SUPPORTS AN ORDER FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Haase argues that the confusion and misunderstanding of the jury in this case do not 
require a new trial. Appellant's Brief at p. 29. More explicitly, she argues that the remedy 
for judicial error is not a new trial. Appellant's Brief at p. 31. This argument is 
inconsistent with the law of Utah and of other jurisdictions. 
A new trial is appropriate where the jury misapplied or misunderstood the law. 
Wellman v. Noble. 366 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 1961), overruled on other grounds, Randle v. 
Allen. 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993). See also, Kitt v. Yakima County. 596 P.2d 314, 317 
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(Wash. App. 1979) (jury misunderstanding of trial court instructions in comparative 
negligence cases is grounds for a new trial); Pache v. Boehm, 60 A.D. 2d 867 (N.Y. App. 
1978) ("where the record demonstrates substantial confusion in reaching a verdict" a new 
trial is appropriate to prevent a miscarriage of justice); Reinhart v. Seaboard C. L. R. Co.. 
472 So. 511 (Fla. App. 1985) (where jury verdict suggests misunderstanding, case should be 
remanded for new trial). 
A clear statement that the jury did not understand its role is provided by juror Tony 
Fagnan: 
When we were deliberating, I don't remember us talking about like breaking 
down this is the harm that was caused by the hospital, this is the harm that 
was caused by the doctor. We were just trying . . . because we were 
focusing on the hospital. And so I don't remember us talking about saying 
okay, the doctor did X amount of dollars of damage here and the hospital did 
this. I mean I think that's the question. We weren't talking about the doctor 
and the hospital between ourselves. And I'm still very confused. But I — 
it was a confusing thing. We really struggled with it. So it was still just 
unknown what the damages ~ what we were figuring. 
Transcript of Jury Hearing at pp. 9, 10 (Exhibit 5, Haase Addendum). 
It is clear that this jury did not have an adequate understanding of the affect of 
apportionment of fault and its role in their verdict. No verdict may be considered just and 
fair to either party when the jurors concede that they did not understand what they were 
doing in reaching that verdict. It is for this reason that the courts of other states, including 
those relied upon by the Utah Supreme Court in its recent Bishop holding cited by Haase, 
have concluded that a new trial is the appropriate remedy for situations such as this. 
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There is an additional basis for concluding that a new trial is the appropriate remedy 
for issues appealed by Haase. A new trial may be granted where there is "irregularity in the 
proceeding of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." Rule 59(a)(1), Utah R.Civ.P. 
The Hospital submits that the Court's failure to comply with requirements of Rule 47(n) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in addition to the Court's acknowledgment of possible 
error in communicating jury instructions, constitute irregularity in the proceedings sufficient 
to ground an order for a new trial. 
The Court received a question in the evening while counsel were "in their motel 
rooms," and acknowledges returning an answer without informing counsel of the question. 
Jury Hearing Transcript at p. 6 (Exhibit 5, Haase Addendum). The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide that a jury may ask for clarification of matters of law after beginning their 
deliberations. The Rules provide, in relevant part: "After the jury have retired for 
deliberation . . . if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause . . . the 
required information must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the parties or 
counsel." Rule 47(n), Utah R.Civ.P. The procedure outlined in the Rule is to be followed 
explicitly. Johnson v. Mavnard. 342 P.2d 884, 887-888 (Utah 1959). 
As in this case, the relevant question in Mavnard was whether the case was submitted 
to the jury in such a manner as to allow "a proper deliberation of the issues." Id. at 885. In 
Mavnard, the judge was asked a question by the deliberating jury and answered the question 
without informing counsel. JcL at 877. Despite the trial judge's action of immediately 
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informing counsel of what he had done, and making a record which afforded an opportunity 
for objection, the Supreme Court found failure to follow the explicit Rule 47 procedure to 
be reversible error, notwithstanding the motivations or intentions of the trial judge. Id at 
887,888 ("Although there is no question that the judge acted with the best of intentions, such 
conduct is improper."). If a trial court error cannot be saved where immediate remedial steps 
are taken by the trial court, it is certainly reversible error where no such steps are taken. 
The Hospital submits that a jury request for clarification of the legal effect of 
apportionment of fault, the process for calculating damages, or the effect of the absence of 
a settled defendant from the trial, are questions of substantial significance which should have 
been addressed by the Court only after informing counsel of the jury request or, at minimum, 
making a record before discharge of the jury. Accordingly, an irregularity in the proceedings 
exists which constitutes an adequate and proper basis for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59(a)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
As Appellee, the Hospital submits that the record and the arguments of the 
Appellant make clear that the error in the verdict was judicial rather than clerical and is 
therefore not susceptible to revision by affidavits or through post-discharge inquiry by the 
Court. Rule 60(a) does not provide for the correction of judicial error. The remedy for 
judicial error is a new trial. 
As Cross-Appellant, the Hospital submits that there were several errors committed 
by the Court in its rulings at trial, the cumulative effect of which was to impart to the jury 
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a bias which is substantial and without which the outcome of the trial would likely have 
been different. The substantial irregularity in the proceedings, and the resulting 
cumulative bias, can be remedied only by a new trial. 
DATED this 22> day of December, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert R. Harrison 
David W. Slagle 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
LONNIE E . PAULOS, M . D . , 
called as a witness, for and on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MORRISON: 
Q. Would you state your name, please. 
A. Lonnie Paulos. 
Q. Are you a medical doctor? 
A. I am an orthopedic surgeon in Salt Lake City. 
Q. Have you been board certified for the last 22 
years? 
A. I have. 
Q. I have your 47-page CV that was handed to me 
before you got here and I'm sure that some of the jurors 
down in Vernal may never have heard of you. Just real 
quickly here, you've been practicing as an orthopedic 
surgeon in Salt Lake for the last how many years? 
A. Approximately 19 years. Since 1983. 
Q. And you've been board certified continuously 
since 1980? 
A. I have. 
Q. And your CV indicates that you've given 
something like several dozen — well, more than that. 
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How many presentations have you given, do you recall? 
A, Somewhere over 300. 
Q. And you have written articles in peer review 
medical journals? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Dozens of those? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. You've also taught instructional courses for 
other doctors on orthopedic surgery? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Extensively? 
A. Yes. 
Q. In January of this year, Dr. Paulos, did you 
receive a letter from me? 
A. I did. 
Q. Can you tell me whether what I'm showing you 
right now is a true and accurate copy of the letter that 
you received from me in late January of this year? 
A. It is. 
Q. I'm going to ask the court reporter to mark 
that as Exhibit A. 
(EXHIBIT-1 MARKED.) 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) I'm going to — this 
letter that I sent to you on January 24th dispenses with 
the normal preliminaries and begins with a question to 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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you that's typed in bold face type; is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I'm going to read that question to you. "If 
the administrators or Medical Executive Committee of 
Ashley Valley Hospital had asked you in early 1993 or at 
any time thereafter whether Dr. Thomas Hawkes was a 
danger to patients by reason of being an impaired or 
compromised provider or due to poor judgment or 
inadequate skill, what would your truthful response have 
been?" Did you read that first sentence of my letter to 
you? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you respond to my letter in writing? 
A. I did. 
Q. Is what is going to be marked Exhibit 2 a true 
and accurate copy of your written response to that 
letter? 
A. It is. 
(EXHIBIT-2 MARKED.) 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) Would you read that for 
me? 
A. "Dear Mr. Mortensen: I have received your 
letter concerning Dr. Thomas Hawkes dated 1-24-02. My 
response to the question that you posed is that patients 
would have been in danger. I am available to discuss 
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this matter with you and to conduct a videotaped 
disposition — deposition. You may contact my 
assistant, Jane Schilling," and so forth. 
Q. Thatfs what you responded? 
A. That is. 
Q. Was it true when you said it? 
A. It is. 
Q. Is it true today? 
A. It is. 
Q. Okay. Dr. Paulos, could you tell us how a 
surgeon such as yourself obtains information about 
another surgeon's technical skill or judgment or 
abilities as a surgeon? 
A. Well, there are probably three or four 
different ways. One, the most direct way and probably 
the most accurate is to see patients in common that each 
have treated, either in second opinion or after a 
complication wherein you're asked to evaluate that 
patient and the care rendered by a physician prior to 
your evaluation. 
The second way would be discussions with other 
physicians who are on staff with physicians in question. 
Some of those could be a committee of credentialing type 
physicians or just orthopedic staff physicians. 
Third would be patients who seek counsel for 
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the family members and/or relatives, and a fourth way is 
peer professionals such as nurses, operating room 
technicians, administrative people. 
Q. Okay. Thank you. 
Do you have any recollection, Dr. Paulos, of 
having received a questionnaire about Dr. Hawkes from 
anyone at Ashley Valley Medical Center or Columbia 
Ashley Valley Hospital back in 1993? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Last November, I'm going to represent to you 
that in November the administrator of that hospital was 
deposed by me and he told me that he didn't have — that 
he didn't make any contact with you and didn't know 
whether the hospital — to his knowledge the hospital 
hadn't made any contact with you. 
MR. HARRISON: Objection, misstates the 
deposition transcript significantly. 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) Well, the transcript says 
whatever it says, but since that time — 
MR. HARRISON: That's an important distinction 
and I reiterate the objection. You're posing a question 
based on your interpretation of what the transcript says 
and what the transcript says is different. So the 
doctor's answer is going to be based on something other 
than what the transcript says. 
p i f i r*^ -.-. v-4- T T P 
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MR. MORTENSEN: Well, I haven't posed the 
question yet. Do you want to tell him how you read the 
transcript? 
MR. HARRISON: You're asking the questions 
here. 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) We've already established, 
Dr. Paulos, that you don't recall receiving a 
questionnaire from the hospital down in Vernal? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Now, recently in the last week I have received 
a copy of a letter supposedly dated March 23, 1993 from 
a person named Deena Mansfield at Ashley Valley Medical 
Center on Ronald Perry letterhead. Would you look at 
that for a moment? And I'm going to ask the court 
reporter to mark this as Exhibit 3. 
(EXHIBIT-3 MARKED.) 
-THE WITNESS: (Witness reviewed document.) 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) After you've read it let 
me know and I'll ask you a couple of questions. 
A. I've read it, yes. 
Q. Okay. Dr. Paulos, is it your policy to 
respond on a questionnaire about another surgeon if you 
are asked to do so? 
A. Yes, I would have. 
Q. Was that your custom and practice back in 
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1993? 
A, Yes. 
Q. Again, do you have any recollection of having 
received that letter? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Is there any reason that you would not have 
responded if you had received it? 
A. No. I might have made a phone call, but I 
would have also followed that with a letter, official 
letter in that I know Ron Perry very well. And so I 
would think I would recall that because Ron and I are 
personal friends. 
Q. How long have you known Ron Perry? 
A. Since 19 — I worked at the hospital, covered 
the Emergency Room and moonlighted there from 197 — 
let's see, 1975 through '79, I believe. 
Q. , So you have known him for a long time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. So do you have any recollection of 
having received any phone call from anyone at Ashley 
Valley Medical Center in 1993? 
A. I don't. 
Q. In 1994? 
A. I don't recall ever receiving a phone call. 
Q. Any year? 
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A. Any time. 
Q. All right. Do you recall ever having talked 
with Ron Perry about Dr. Hawkes? 
A. I don't recall at this time, but I could have. 
I don't recall. 
Q. Now, I'm not going to try and misstate and I 
haven't so far tried to misstate Ron Perry's testimony, 
but I think he testified that during the recruiting 
process of Dr. Hawkes, Dr. Hawkes told him that he had 
had a falling out with his colleagues at Cottonwood 
Hospital, including you and Dr. Rosenberg, and he 
indicated to Dr. — to Ron Perry that the reason for 
that falling out was of jealousies over his, Dr. Hawkes, 
having some preeminence in laser surgery. 
MR. HARRISON: Objection, misstates testimony. 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) Okay. Now — 
"MR. HARRISON: Mr. Perry didn't say anything 
about jealousy. 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) Well, did you have any --
had there been a falling out between you and Dr. Hawkes? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. Tom and I are very 
good friends. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall ever having talked to 
Deena Mansfield, this person whose signature appears at 
the bottom of that May 23 — or excuse me, March 23, 
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1993 letter? 
A. I do not recall. 
Q. Are you personally aware of Dr. Thomas Hawkes1 
return to Salt Lake City after his lengthy stint in the 
military? 
A. I am. 
Q. And are you aware that he started in Salt Lake 
City with the Salt Lake Clinic and doing surgeries at 
the LDS Hospital? 
A. I am. 
Q. What are you aware of concerning how long that 
lasted? 
A. When Tom first came back, Tom and I are 
friends from college and we played on the football team 
together up at the University of Utah, he was a 
linebacker and I was his strong safety, and we became 
very good-friends and I respected Tom very much. When 
he came back I was interested in perhaps him joining 
myself and Tom Rosenberg as a partner in our practice 
and we had preliminary discussions with Tom concerning 
that venture. 
As it turned out, there was various hearsay 
and discussions amongst other staff and the nurses and 
the techs that Tom was less than proficient in the 
operating room, was perhaps not showing the greatest 
Lonnie Paulos, M.D. - March 4, 2002 13 
judgment in some of his case selection. Tom Rosenberg 
brought that to my attention within a year of Tom 
Hawkes' arrival and was not interested in having Tom 
join us, Rosenberg wasn't interested in having Tom 
Hawkes join us. 
I was disappointed in that in that Tim and I 
were good friends, but I understood it and we agreed to 
just proceed to watch and see how he did before pursuing 
it any further. It became apparent that he probably was 
not the best orthopedic surgeon in the valley and 
probably one we wouldn't wanted to be associated with 
our practice and so we decided not to pursue it any 
further. I can't tell you that time frame at all, I 
just know that Tom Rosenberg and I talked about it on 
several occasions. Ultimately he left LDS Hospital and 
relocated out in Cottonwood Hospital. 
Q. Do you know how long he had been at LDS 
Hospital? 
A. I don't recall the detail, I don't. 
Q. Was it a relatively short or long time? 
A. It was a short time, I believe, but I can't 
tell you. I really would just be guessing. I lost 
track of Tom out at Cottonwood, really. I don't recall 
any specific cases that alarmed me when he was out here. 
I recall a story where he had operated on himself 
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filtering back up. We came out and built TOSH and 
occupied it in '91 and I assumed Tom was still here. We 
really didn't even have discussions, although in the 
back of my mind there was — Tom may have approached us 
about doing work here at TOSH and I'm sure we would have 
denied him by that time because we were concerned — 
THE COURT REPORTER: Could I stop you here? 
(Off the record.) 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) Can you pick that up mid 
sentence? 
A. Yes. I don't know that Tom and I had any 
discussions out here, when we were out here and he was 
here at Cottonwood. Somewhere in the back of my memory 
he may have asked to do some cases here at TOSH and he 
didn't have privileges and couldn't do it. So when he 
left for Ashley Hospital it was without my knowledge or 
discussions with Tom and I wouldn't have known until 
later and notified when he was already there. 
Q. Can you recall when you heard of this incident 
of his having attempted surgery on himself? 
A. I can't. 
Q. Now, while we were off the record 
accommodating the court reporter who ran out of 
batteries or something, you looked at this letter from 
Deena Mansfield and that touched something off in your 
memory? 
A. Well, I'm trying to remember. It just seems 
that I — in this instance I would have called Ron. And 
I think I talked to him about Tom Hawkes and I think I 
didn't have very good things to say and I didn't want to 
put it in a letter form and I handled it with a phone 
call. And that's what I think I did, but I can't be 
sure of that. But this letter kind of sparked a memory 
in me for several reasons. One is I knew Ron very well 
and I knew Tom very well and I wanted Tom very badly to 
succeed, and it seems to me I had a conversation with 
Ron Perry. 
Q. From what you've said, I'm taking that this 
conversation was such that you expressed some serious 
reservations about his ability to perform orthopedic 
surgeries? 
A. I would have expressed that there were some 
issues in Salt Lake Valley, that he would have to, if he 
accepted him, be monitored very closely. And it seems 
like I had a conversation with someone about Tom Hawkes. 
Q. By 1996, let's say March 12, 1996, which is 
the date my client was operated on by Dr. Hawkes, if you 
had been contacted, say, in early March of 1996 by 
anyone associated with the recredentialing of Dr. 
Hawkes, what kind of response would you have given by 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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then? 
MR. HARRISON: Objection, foundation, form of 
the question, relevance. 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) You may answer. 
A. The response I would have given at that time 
would have been definitely negative. 
Q. And why? 
A. By then quite a few cases had emerged out of 
the Vernal area of basically what I thought was 
malpractice, certainly poor treatment, unethical 
billing, and I was very alarmed and concerned for 
patients' care. I had I believe by '95 collected, 
sometime in '95, three or four cases of my own that were 
workman's compensation related cases and I sent those to 
the Workman's Compensation Board for peer review. I 
actually — 
Q. What was the problem in those cases? 
A. In those cases they were inappropriate 
surgeries that were billed unethically, multiple charges 
for procedures that can't be performed with a laser. 
Q. These were surgeries by Dr. Hawkes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were some of the surgeries that he had billed 
for surgeries that you found hadn't even taken place? 
A. I don't know that it hadn't taken place. 
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Basically, if you say I repaired a meniscus, I welded a 
meniscus or a shoulder ligament with a laser and you 
charge for ligament stabilization or a meniscal repair, 
that's totally unethical because laser doesn't work that 
way. That isn't the way in which you repair an ACL or 
which you repair a meniscus or a shoulder ligament, and 
he was doing that repeatedly. So he was billing major 
charges for surgical procedures using a device that has 
simply not ever been found or taught or authorized to be 
used for those procedures. 
Q. Let's go back to this laser issue. To your 
knowledge, was Dr. Hawkes a preeminent practitioner in 
the use of laser in surgeries as of 1993? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know that to be — do you know that 
from — how do you know that? 
A. • Well, first of all, in the sports medicine and 
knee and shoulder surgery area, I consider myself to be 
perhaps one of the preeminent people in the 
intermountain area, which means that most courses that 
are related to the arthroscopic surgery and/or laser I 
would have been a participanted in many times. I myself 
had given by that time some laser papers using laser 
energy for some procedures that we were investigating. 
We had a laser here at TOSH. I had been involved in 
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certifying physicians for laser use here at TOSH and Dr. 
Hawkes was not part of, nor to my knowledge, ever part 
of any of those courses nor certification processes. 
Q. Do you recall having received any contact from 
anyone associated with Ashley Valley Hospital or Medical 
Center in 1995? 
A. No. Unless the conversation in my head I'm 
remembering was in '95, not f93. But no, I don't recall 
it specifically. 
Q. This conversation, your best recollection is 
that it would have occurred back in '93? 
A. I think this letter would have prompted me to 
call Ron Perry. And somewhere along the line I think I 
talked to Ron about Tom Hawkes. 
Q. And that contacting him, not in writing but 
otherwise, was to sort of tip him off that he may have 
some problems? 
A. That's correct. 
(EXHIBIT-4 MARKED.) 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) Is Exhibit 4 a true and 
accurate copy of your current CV? It's 47 pages long. 
A. I'm not sure it's been brought up-to-date. I 
think it's short by about six months. 
Q. Would it be pretty accurate but for the last 
six months as well? 
CitiCourt, LLC 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Dr. Paulos, I don't think I've asked 
specifically how you would have responded in 1995. I 
think my most recent question on that was how you would 
have responded in 1996. Would your response have been 
the same in 1995? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. It would have been highly negative? 
A. Highly negative. 
Q. When, if at all, did you ever become aware of 
Dr. Hawkes having any sort of problems with drug use? 
MR. HARRISON: Objection, foundation. 
MR. HALL: Join. 
THE WITNESS: I was not aware of it until 
after his death. 
Q. (BY MR. MORTENSEN) So your reservations would 
not have been based on any sort of impairment related to 
drug use, but as to skill and judgment in performing 
surgeries; is that correct? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Were you ever jealous of Dr. Hawkes? 
A. I may have been during my college. He was a 
great football player. 
Q. I mean in professional as a doctor. 
A. No, absolutely not. I wanted Tom to succeed 
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in every way possible. 
MR. MORTENSEN: Thank you. I don't think I 
have any more questions. 
MR. HARRISON: I just want to make a couple of 
observations for the record. Number one, to formally 
assert a continuing objection to the use of videotaped 
trial depositions in this case and to continue to 
reserve the right, which the judge has allowed me, to 
ask him to order witnesses to appear at trial, if 
necessary. Number two, to object to a videotape made of 
this proceeding because it's made on a home camera 
without a certified videographer. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HARRISON: 
Q. Dr. Paulos, I just want to be sure that I 
understand what you've told me. I think I do, forgive 
me if I'm-asking you to repeat yourself. You believe, 
but are not sure, that you had a conversation with Ron 
Perry upon receipt of the letter from the hospital? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. But you don't remember the content, you don't 
remember the substance of the conversation? 
A. Not in specific. 
Q. Okay. Do you recall ever having a 
conversation subsequent to that with Mr. Perry about Dr. 
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Hawkes? 
A. No, I do not. 
Q. Do you recall ever having a conversation with 
anyone else at Ashley Valley Medical Center about Dr. 
Hawkes? 
A. I do not. 
MR. HARRISON: Thatfs all I have. 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MORTENSEN: 
Q. I've got a couple. First I want to spread on 
the record the fact that my normal videographer, Blaine 
Gale, spoke with me this morning about having to drive 
his mother to the funeral of the last relative on the 
Gale line and couldn't attend. The second thing I want 
to spread on the record is a series of real quick 
questions to you, Dr. Paulos, about your practice here 
right now- in Salt Lake. 
This trial is scheduled to begin in March, on 
March 11, which is a week from today. Do you have 
surgeries scheduled for next week, March 11 through the 
15th? 
A. I believe I do, plus I'm also out of town. 
Q. Where will you be? 
A. Africa. 
Q. Will you be in Africa the week following March 
